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ABSTRACT
Democracy requires open public service broadcasting (PSB) institutions that constantly interact 
with active informed citizens. This article posits that a more proactive network of civil society 
across Southern Africa can produce impact on PSB institutions in these countries enhancing 
reform and accountability to the public. We enter this topic by identifying pathways towards 
increased cooperation among public service broadcasters (PSBs), civil society coalitions and 
other stakeholders in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The main focus is on the interaction between 
broadcasters, policy makers and civil society groups, namely SOS: Support Public Broadcasting 
in South Africa (SOS) and the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe (MAZ), two leading media activist 
organisations in Southern Africa. The engagement by such networks can deepen public interest 
and reconnect PSB institutions and PSB staff to the PSB mandate and mission. Civil society 
coalitions working collaboratively with PSB will engender a context within which a 
collaboratively defined PSB mission, institutional structure, and programme outcomes are 
constantly foregrounded in the operations and performance of the broadcasters. 
Keywords: PSB reform, African broadcasting, African Civil Society, participatory policymaking, 
civic coalitions
Introduction
Public service broadcasting (PSB) policy reform works better if it reflects the interests of all 
stakeholders in the public broadcasting policy arena. Good governance in public service must be 
premised on transparency and accountability. Both these are attainable if citizens have space to 
participate in governance. In this article we argue that PSB reforms can achieve much more 
democratic impact if a participatory approach to PSB policy negotiation is followed. In our view, 
such broad-based, participatory policy-making can be achieved through genuine collaboration 
among public service broadcasters (PSBs), civil society organisations (CSOs) and governmental 
policy-makers. Outlining how the CSOs can offer a pathway to participatory policy negotiation 
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is the key focus of this article. We argue for increased cooperation among PSBs, CSOs and other 
stakeholders in South Africa and Zimbabwe. For us, such cooperation is necessary at local, 
national and regional level. This argument is in line with the conclusions reached by a 2013 
survey of PSB in 11 African countries, including South Africa and Zimbabwe. The survey, 
conducted by a coalition of media advocacy bodies and practitioners, concluded amongst others 
that, while there is broad consensus that independent PSB in Africa is indispensable for 
democratisation, broadcasting reform efforts in these countries are generally sluggish due to a 
lack of political will and lethargy of civil society (Bussiek, Minnie, Mwesige, and Tabuwe 
2013). It was found that the transformation by appropriate legislation of state into public 
broadcasters will not suffice to make them independent media. Rather, a reform of media-related 
legislation in general is needed in tandem with broadcasting reform. Hence, calls to reform PSB 
include regulatory, financial and technological aspects. It was therefore recommended that 
further research be undertaken to respond to legislative challenges towards transforming public 
broadcasters in Africa. Specifically, the survey recommended that further research be undertaken 
in three areas relating to (1) PSB structure and governance; (2) training of PSB staff and 
management and finally, (3) a more engaged civil society (ibid:2, 6). In this article we respond to 
the latter by outlining how a more engaged civil society within the Southern African context can 
respond to legislative and policy challenges for Southern African PSBs.
This article makes a case for seizing collaboration opportunities between CSOs as a pathway to 
genuine PSB reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe. It argues that enhanced cooperation among 
civil society groups and other PSB stakeholders in and between South Africa and Zimbabwe 
could potentially increase public participation in and ownership of PSB in these contexts. The 
regional study cited above specifically recommended that civil society should take a more active 
interest in monitoring the operations of the public broadcaster and engage in advocacy to ensure 
that African PSBs meet their public service obligations. In particular, more awareness was 
needed among all stakeholders on the principle and ethos of PSB in African contexts. We will 
argue here that the extent to which PSB reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe will be 
encouraged or inhibited depends on genuine interaction between PSBs and their Southern 
African publics. 
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The main research questions this article seeks to address are: 
● What is the role of civil society and other PSB users in the processes of PSB reform?
● What are the challenges and key contingencies of successful enactment of this role? 
● How can a more inclusive participatory approach be engendered towards media policy 
negotiation and implementation in the public interest? 
Unless the ideas and perspectives of PSB publics are transmitted to the broadcasting and political 
arena, we cannot talk about the power of people. And unless PSBs have a clear-cutt strategy for 
how to engage with the information, knowledge and relations developed as outcomes of 
interactions with their publics, the pathways to democratic PSB reform will be limited. We posit 
that a more proactive civil society across Southern Africa can also directly engage PSB 
institutions in these countries to be more accountable to the public through empowering these 
public institutions to consistently sensitize their staff to a collectively agreed upon PSB mandate 
and mission. We enter this topic by exploring coalition building and cooperation as evident in the 
interaction between PSB broadcasters, policy makers and the civil society groups SOS: Support 
Public Broadcasting (SOS) in South Africa and the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe (MAZ), two 
prominent media activist organisations in Southern Africa. In this respect, both authors 
participated in the 2013 Midrand Call to Action which is a good example of civic society 
coalitions for PSB reform. The event had the support of the Pan African Parliament - who in fact 
hosted the conference in Midrand, South Africa and managed to bring together continental 
stakeholders as well as donor agencies from the Northern hemisphere. As both authors 
participated in the event, they can attest to the perception that, while the deliberations were 
progressive, one can say that apart from a few notable exceptions, the experts from the North 
framed and dominated the policy conception phase. African stakeholders were largely included 
at the operationalisation stage and as implementers. Unlike this experience, in  this article we 
argue for  more inclusive collaboration whereby all stakeholders have a voice in PSB reform.
 The inclusion of civil society groups in PSB at the strategic policy level brings together the key 
stakeholders in a more meaningful manner. This, we believe, will engender a PSB reform 
context within which a collaboratively defined PSB mission, institutional structure, and 
programme outcomes are consistently foregrounded in the operations and content of PSB 
institutions. Crucially, it will open avenues for increased public participation and free expression 
which may influence a new thinking among all stakeholders, including policy-makers in 
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government, business, research institutions and development agencies. Situating the debate in 
this way paves the way for understanding the transformative potential of participation within 
PSB as an alternative framework to be rationalized and understood. 
From the case studies below, it can be seen how the two selected CSOs, employing some of the 
techniques highlighted above, have to some extent succeeded in holding PSBs in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe to account. They have largely achieved this through establishing and taking to 
heart civic alliances and transdisciplinary networks as will be illustrated below. Civic coalitions 
ought not to pay lip-service to collective and participatory decision-making particularly in 
contexts with intricate postcolonial political and institutional setups. Below we unpack the 
background context as well as the ways in which SOS and MAZ engage in coalition building and 
participatory decision-making towards policy reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Civil Society Organisation Participation in Southern African PSB
The role of civil society in African contexts could focus on how to make these contexts better 
equipped to engage the public towards holding public officials accountable and consolidating 
democracy. Yet, CSOs operating in under-resourced and under-developed contexts - such as 
rural areas in Zimbabwe and South Africa - do not always have access to mainstream or even 
community media to help amplify their voice. If CSOs remain coalition-less, their ability to drive 
change in and for their affected constituents will be greatly diminished. Our work with and 
research of CSOs in South Africa and Zimbabwe  uncovered that economic, technical and legal 
expertise is unevenly distributed among them, especially among small and poorly resourced 
CSOs. Lack of skills in any of these critical areas could be an additional deterrent to a CSOs 
ability to fully participate in PSB reform. The question of who participates and what biases exist 
in the participation process are increasingly significant for PSB reform. The level of participation 
determines the potential impact of any CSO. Dalton’s (2017) insights on the participation gap - 
which explicates how participation is unequally meaningful for different social groups in 
democracies - is of relevance here. This, it could be argued, results in different public policy 
outcomes that impacts the lived conditions of ordinary citizens in ways that do not necessarily 
add value for the marginalised in even the most sophisticated democracies. In Africa poverty and 
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numerous social distinctions exacerbates the participation gap. We therefore argue for a more 
nuanced approach to collaboration within and across CSOs who could be more resourced, more 
empowered and emboldened to exercise their right to participate in deliberative policy-making 
for PSB reform in Southern Africa. A networked civil society can potentially act as an important 
counterweight to rogue PSBs and other powerful actors in the market. They can provide an 
infrastructure for collective action and assist in informing publics about their rights and shaping 
public discourse and debate. 
CSOs in Southern African contexts can be an important link between public interest policies and 
meaningful change in relation to PSB. However, for CSOs in this context to be more effective in 
terms of contributing towards policy-making, media monitoring and shifting the priorities of 
PSBs, they need to acquire civic skills and be legally astute. The civic voluntarism model, 
developed by Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Brady (1995), identifies three kinds of civic skills 
that are crucial for CSOs to collaborate effectively: resource-based skills (pooling of time and 
money); communication skills (speaking with friends or family about political issues, making 
presentations or speaking publicly, letter-writing or other forms of contacting public officials); 
and organizational and civic skills (such as forming committees, leading meetings, attending 
meetings and seeking political information). We perceive such a civic role can be achieved via 
robust civic alliances and transdisciplinary networks. Civic society coalitions are formed when 
“...various CSOs including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), people’s movements, 
community based organisations (CBOs), activists, unions, plus researchers, lawyers and 
journalists” come together to shape policy, engage in policy negotiations and ensure that policy 
is implemented (Barnes, Van Laerhoven & Driessen 2016: 162). This, in our view, creates a 
broad alliance which has an unusual blend of talent and skills to drive PSB reform. In many 
Southern African societies, it is such broad based CSOs that can help increase citizen activism 
towards democratic change, especially in the broadcasting sector. 
Looking at the contexts of South Africa and Zimbabwe, their shared but slightly different 
historical trajectories have shaped social movements across the duration of both countries’ long 
struggle for freedom and equality for all. In spite of social, and initially political, differences, the 
freedom struggles in both countries have included various forms of civil society coalitions and 
media activism. In the 1970s and 1980s in particular, South Africa witnessed militant and 
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powerful community-based movements, which used a wide range of tactics to delegitimize the 
local government (Sinwell 2011). Where media is concerned, South African civil society has an 
established history of engaging government over issues threatening media independence. In 1990 
for example, under the banner of the Campaign for Open Media (COM), over a thousand South 
Africans mobilised around broadcasting matters in a march towards the SABC meant to thwart 
an undemocratic restructuring of the South African broadcasting space. The COM was later 
replaced by the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB), consisting of an alliance of trade 
unions, civic organisations, cultural and political formations, academics, journalists and media 
practitioners who fought for the establishment of an independent regulatory authority to regulate 
broadcasting as a whole. Today, this space is filled by amongst others the SOS Coalition and the 
Right-to-Know Campaign. Zimbabwe has an equally long history of media activism, first during 
the liberation war against the Rhodesian white minority regime and later against the government 
of Robert Mugabe, whose checkered democratic rule lasted from 1980 until 2017. In 2013, for 
example, Zimbabwe’s Combined Harare Residents’ Association (CHRA) mobilised listeners and 
viewers against ZBC’s forced payment “for very poor or non-existent services or for a product 
that they are being asked to consume against their will and which commodity they may, after all, 
not consume at all because it is not palatable” (Samukange 2013: n.pag). This is typical of civic 
activism that has over the years grown against poor service from ZBC. Today, this space is filled 
by the MAZ and its extended coalition. While apartheid South Africa and post-independent 
Zimbabwe under the rule of Robert Mugabe both clamped down on civic freedoms - including 
the formation of CSOs and activism towards media freedom and freedom of expression - both 
contexts are also in theory increasingly reforming the spaces for participatory governance 
between government and civil society. It therefore makes sense to look at South Africa and 
Zimbabwe in the context of emerging collaboration and enhanced impact from national, regional 
and international actors. 
From the case studies below, it can be seen how the two selected CSOs, employing some of the 
techniques highlighted above, have to some extent succeeded in holding PSBs in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe to account. They have largely achieved this through establishing and taking to 
heart civic alliances and transdisciplinary networks, as will be illustrated below. Civic coalitions 
ought not to pay lip-service to collective and participatory decision-making, particularly in 
contexts with intricate postcolonial political and institutional setups. Below we unpack the 
7
background context as well as the ways in which SOS and MAZ engage in coalition building and 
participatory decision-making towards policy reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The 
unpacking of the case studies below is based on our ongoing research on PSB and CSOs in 
Southern Africa.  For this article, we followed a qualitative approach engaging news reports, 
public documents, interviews and participant-observation. 
SOS: Support Public Broadcasting
The existing regulatory framework for broadcasting in South Africa was a direct product of 
popular mobilizations and pressures of the transition period (Sparks, 2009; Tomaselli & Teer-
Tomaselli, 2008; Louw, 1993) which resulted in the Broadcasting Act of 1999, which has since 
undergone a series of amendments brought about by continued CSO monitoring of the South 
African broadcasting space. These changes have however not resulted in a reformed South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) that can withstand the test of time and as a result, the 
Save our SABC: Reclaiming our Public Broadcaster Coalition entered the South African public 
sphere in June 2008 to deal with a multitude of crises that was unfolding and continue to unfold 
at the SABC. The Coalition, which was later rebranded as SOS: Support Public Broadcasting 
(SOS), is hosted by Media Monitoring Africa (MMA), who also acts as its fiscal agent. In a 2014 
interview with Kate Skinner, SOS founding member and its first National Coordinator, she noted 
that SOS came into being in 2008 as a short-term campaign that was supposed to last for a few 
months only:
The 2007 SABC Board needed to be removed because of political interference by the 
President. However, we have learnt that civil society will always be required to keep the 
public broadcaster accountable, transparent and independent. The instability from 2007 
has not abated. There is a sense that the SABC will always be contested...this is a long 
term and ongoing project (Personal Interview with Kate Skinner, 2014)
As a result, what was meant to be a short-term campaign, evolved into a membership based 
single-issue coalition representing unions, non-governmental organisations, CBOs, community 
media, independent film and TV production sector organisations; academics, freedom of 
expression activists and concerned individuals. In civil society, coalition connotes a group effort 
or a population of people coming together who believe strongly in a particular cause or set of 
causes (Barnes C., Van Laerhoven F. & Driessen P.P.J.,  2016). The concept also describes 
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alliances between CSOs, such as labor unions, community organizations and religious 
institutions that come together to achieve common goals, in this case PSB reform. At the outset, 
for example, the SOS coalition included such notable organisations as the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI), The National 
Consumer Forum, the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) and the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC). Individual members included amongst others the late activist and 
freedom fighter Jeanette Minnie, the late journalist and freedom of expression activist Raymond 
Louw, and broadcasting lawyer and academic at the University of Witwatersrand, Justine 
Limpitlaw (in her private capacity). In their tribute to Jeannette Minnie upon her passing in 2016, 
the SOS notes that
At the SOS launch meeting in June 2008 she shared her experiences as an activist in the 
early 1990s. She talked about the power of collective action and the power of building 
civil society coalitions across political perspectives and across different groupings 
including unions, NGOs, academics and individual activists. She was a leading member 
of the Campaign for Open Media and the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting active 
in the 1990s. The SOS Coalition drew inspiration from these powerful, transformative 
campaigns (SOS 2016: n.pag) 
This commitment to coalitions and alliances remain a strong focus of the organisation. At the 
most recent Annual General Meeting of the SOS (November 2019), 11 organisations and an 
additional 11 individuals renewed their membership to the Coalition.
The Coalition aims towards creating a public broadcasting system dedicated to the broadcasting 
of quality, diverse, citizen-orientated public programming committed to deepening South 
Africa’s Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights and socio-economic rights. Specifically, 
they focus on strengthening the SABC (and of late, also community radio and TV). Their current 
efforts are geared in particular towards ensuring that new comprehensive legislation is drafted 
for the SABC (and community media) that ensures their effective governance and funding (SOS: 
Support Public Broadcasting 2019a: n.pag). At its inception in 2008, the Coalition called for:
● An assessment of the root causes of problems plaguing the SABC;
● A comprehensive review of the White Paper on Broadcasting (developed more than 10 
years ago) in order to, amongst other things, assess the effectiveness of policies and 
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evaluate its relevance given the changes to the broadcasting environment due to 
convergence, digital migration and so on; and
● Flowing from the policy review, the promulgation of a comprehensive new SABC Act to 
replace the current Broadcasting Act, 1999 (Save our SABC: Reclaiming our Public 
Broadcaster 2009: n.pag) 
In 2018, their Vision Document was revised to reflect the gradual shift towards a broader 
systems’ level approach to reform PSB. The idea was to situate the SABC within the media 
ecology of South Africa. During discussions for the revisions, it became clear that there is a 
continued need to attend to the above bullet points, as the issues they were meant to address 
remained unresolved (Personal observation by second author of this article). Originally the 
organisation had a very specific focus on the institution of the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), but they have now shifted towards a wider focus on the role of all three 
tiers of broadcasting in the country, including public, community and commercial (SOS: Support 
Public Broadcasting 2019b). The shift in focus reflects a soft version of Fourie’s (2005) 
suggestion that PSB in South Africa, be perceived as more of a genre rather than an institution. 
While the SOS is not advocating for the removal of PSB as an institution, they are now 
advocating for community broadcasting with a public-interest, citizenship role at the local level. 
In addition, the Coalition is calling for commercial broadcasters to be required, through their 
licence conditions, to play a public interest role (albeit a much more limited one than that played 
by the public broadcaster and community broadcasters). In this respect, commercial broadcasters 
should, among other aspects, be required to provide news, meet some language requirements and 
local programming quotas. As can be seen below the SOS often plays a watchdog role over the 
SABC and the broader broadcasting environment, monitoring both the PSB institution and 
government as well as litigating to ensure public interest values and the right to communicate is 
upheld.
SOS Activism
Since its inception, the SOS Coalition have tenuously fought government’s attempts to take over 
the SABC. They do so through press statements, media advocacy and court cases. Between 2008 
and 2019, they have for example taken government to court on a number of issues, winning 
several important cases in 2017 and 2018, two of which will be highlighted here:
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● The first centers on the November 2018 judgement in the SABC- Multichoice deal
● The second pertains to an October 2017 ruling that affirmed the independence of the 
SABC Board
These cases are used here to illustrate the Coalition’s efforts at holding the government and the 
SABC to account. A brief outline of the SOS Coalition’s involvement in each is presented 
below, followed by some thoughts on the meanings of coalitions and alliances in relation to the 
SOS. It is not our intention to outline the detailed specifics of each case, but rather to ascertain 
the ways in which the SOS relied on its coalition members or entered into alliances with other 
interested parties to impact upon PSB policy and the regulatory framework for PSB in South 
Africa. The very brief outline below relies on news reports, the SOS’s public documents and 
participant-observation by one of the authors who was a working group member of the SOS 
during the periods under purview. She is also an elected board member since 2017 and was re-
elected to the board at the 2019 Annual General Meeting of the SOS Coalition.
The first of the SOS case studies concerns the controversial July 2013 contract between the 
SABC, South Africa’s public service broadcaster; and Multichoice, Africa’s largest pay 
television operator. In terms of the R550 million agreement, Multichoice was given the right to 
broadcast the SABC’s 24-hour news channel and an entertainment channel, SABC Encore. At 
the time both SOS and MMA (its coalition partner and host organisation) raised concerns about 
the constitutional legality of the contract, noting that it may work against the SABCs public 
service mandate. In 2015 it was then alleged that as part of the deal the SABC undertook to back 
MultiChoice’s position on digital migration, which was that set-top boxes to convert the digital 
signal to analogue after migration would not be encrypted. Before the deal, the SABC was a 
staunch supporter of encryption. Hlaudi Motsoneng, then Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the 
SABC, was awarded an R11m “bonus” for negotiating the contract (Kgosana 2018). The SOS: 
Support Public Broadcasting, MMA as well as Caxton Publishers joined forces in an effort to 
have the South African Competition’s Tribunal investigate if the contract constitutes a notifiable 
merger. Caxton Publishers is one of South Africa’s largest print media companies with its 
newspaper division alone responsible for 88 titles. It also publishes 15 magazine titles. While 
Caxton Publishers is not a coalition member of SOS, it did form an alliance with the coalition on 
this particular issue. In December 2013, City Press newspaper reported that the former SABC 
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board was handed the MultiChoice-SABC deal as a fait accompli (Gedye 2015). It alleged that 
according to SABC board minutes leaked to City Press at the time, the contract was handled by 
the then communications minister Dina Pule, then SABC group CEO Lulama Mokhobo and Ben 
Ngubane, then SABC board chairperson (ibid). In his affidavit lodged with the tribunal, Caxton’s 
CEO, Terrence ­Moolman, argued that, through the agreement, MultiChoice has “acquired 
control” over the SABC’s TV broadcasting policy as well as its programme archives:
Until it concluded the agreement with MultiChoice, the SABC supported the delivery of 
DTT signals to South African viewers on the basis that these signals would be encrypted 
... The SABC has, as a result of concluding the agreement with MultiChoice, aligned 
itself with MultiChoice by departing from that position...The transfer of control of this 
asset to MultiChoice confers a competitive advantage on an overwhelmingly dominant 
rival (Gedye, 2015: n.pag).
As argued in Moolman’s affidavit, the problem with this, from both a policy and competition 
framework, is that the agreement has vested MultiChoice with the ability to materially influence 
a fundamental aspect of the SABC’s television broadcasting business, which MMA’s William 
Bird noted was definitely in contravention of the SABCs public interest mandate (ibid). In 2018, 
after a years-long battle - which included a stint at the South African Constitutional Court - the 
Competition Commission has ruled in favor of SOS, MMA and Caxton, declaring that the 
channel distribution agreement between the SABC and MultiChoice signed in 2013 does indeed 
constitute a notifiable merger (Kgosana 2018). The Commission instructed the public 
broadcaster and Multichoice to register the transaction as a merger, failing which they will be in 
violation of competition laws.
In the second case study, a much more complicated case, involving the independence of the 
SABC Board was brought to the court by SOS and two of its coalition members. In 2014, the 
then Minister of Communications, Faith Muthambi, unilaterally amended the Memorandum of 
Incorporation (MOI), thereby conferring upon her office the power to appoint, suspend and 
dismiss the public service broadcaster’s Group Chief Executive Officer (GCEO), Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) and Chief Operations Officer (COO), as well as over the SABC board more 
generally.
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The amendment to the MOI came after the SOS had already launched an application in 2014 in 
the North Gauteng High Court against the SABC and the minister over the manner in which the 
CEO, CFO and COO were appointed. In 2015, SOS, its host organisation and coalition partner, 
MMA and coalition partner, the Freedom of Expression Institute, lodged a case which sought 
specifically to challenge the role and power of the South African Minister of Communications in 
appointing members of the SABC Board and in the removal of senior executives. SOS coalition 
member, the Right2Know Campaign, joined the case as a “friend” of the court. In addition, SOS 
coalition member, the South African Screen Federation (SASFED), supported the SOS court 
action in an open letter to the Minister of Communications. Thandie Smith, Head of Policy at 
MMA and chairperson of the SOS Board, writes that:
The first case, which is referred to as ‘SABC 1’ concerned the lawfulness of the powers 
vested in the minister under SABC’s Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) and SABC 
Charter in respect of the appointment, discipline and suspension of the three executive 
directors of the SABC, being the GCEO, COO and CFO. The central issue in dispute was 
whether the powers vested in the minister undermined the independence of the SABC, 
which SOS, MMA and FXI contend is required by the right to freedom of expression 
(including the freedom of the media) under S16 of the Constitution...The second case, 
called ‘SABC 2’, concerned the power of the minister to remove all of the directors of the 
SABC board, including the non-executive directors. The issue at the centre of this case 
was whether section 71 of the Companies Act may be applied in the removal of directors 
of the SABC, or whether the procedures under sections 15 and 15A of the Broadcasting 
Act should be followed. (Smith 2018: n.pag).
As it turned out, and in favour of the SOS coalition’s position, the case was a significant victory 
for the independence of the SABC Board as the Court found the powers that the Minister 
afforded her office to be unconstitutional. In essence, Judge Elias Matojane declared several 
clauses of the amended MOI and the SABC charter in respect to the appointment, discipline and 
suspension of the public service broadcaster’s three executive directors – GCEO, CFO and COO 
– inconsistent with the Broadcasting Act and thus invalid. Crucially, the court ruled that the 
powers vested in the Minister undermined the independence of the SABC:
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in her engagement with the board, the minister represents ... the sole shareholder of the 
SABC – the Government of the Republic of South Africa. It is Parliament, not the 
minister, that represents the public interest and performs an oversight role on behalf of 
the public. (De Vos 2018: n.pag)
In terms of the judgment therefore, the SABC Board controls the affairs of the public broadcaster 
and as such, executive members of the board are to be appointed solely by the non-executive 
members of the Board and without any requirement of approval by the Minister. It was also ruled 
that the board can now, without the prior approval of the Minister, institute disciplinary 
proceedings against the GCEO, CFO or COO, as well as suspend them if need be. The court 
found, among other things, that “the amendments to MOI in September 2014 by Minister 
Muthambi entrenched the minister’s power over the GCEO, CFO and COO, as well as over the 
SABC board more generally” (ibid). In the judgement, which upheld the SOS Coalition’s 
position, the court noted that while the Broadcasting Act was silent on the appointment of the 
executive directors, certain sections of the amended MOI of the SABC and the Board charter 
were not consistent with the Broadcasting Act, hence the court ruled that section 71 of the 
Companies Act which deals with the removal of directors of the SABC, “... cannot be construed 
as applying to the SABC because the Broadcasting Act prevails over the Companies Act as it 
was specifically enacted to govern the operations of the SABC” (Smith 2018: n.pag). As will be 
seen below, a similar situation arose in Zimbabwe around the Companies Act and the 
incorporation of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. The ruling issued by the Zimbabwean 
Constitutional Court rejected the idea that it was a business and confirmed the public interest 
mandate of the ZBC in much the same way as happened in the South African case study above. 
Interestingly, whereas in South Africa, civil society coalitions fought to have the MOI 
amendments declared unlawful in relation to the public service broadcaster, in Zimbabwe, it was 
members of the public that questioned the public service role of the ZBC light if the 
Zimbabwean Companies Act. 
It is our contention that the SOS Coalition has played a pivotal role in addressing PSB reform in 
South Africa and remains to exist as a critical force in defending and upholding PSB 
independence from business and politics alike. We argue that the above cases illustrate the 
detrimental impacts that media capture can have on the governance and operations of a PSB 
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institution. More importantly, they illustrate the necessity for CSOs to be well versed in the 
regulatory and policy frameworks that govern broadcasting in a specific country. Fortunately the 
SOS coalition constitutes varied experience and knowledge, including legal oversight on the key 
PSB processes and they have up until now been sufficiently funded to ensure their ability to 
enforce accountability for broadcasting in the public interest. This position might change in 
future, given the changing funding and civil society environment for PSB advocacy.
The above illustrates a conscious and purposive coming together of key organisations to 
collaborate on reforming broadcasting. The civic formation was able to unpack the intricacies in 
the SABC-Multichoice deal, itself an example of media capture by other means. It is also 
illustrative of what can happen if PSB management, state actors and the PSB board are not 
themselves fully vested in the legal framework for PSB and do not fully comprehend what public 
interest and public value might mean in the context of PSB. What is at stake in this circumstance 
is the ability of Southern African PSB institutions to fulfil their public interest mandate and to 
operate free from political-economic interference. While the Multichoice deal for example 
exemplifies economic/business capture of the SABC, the Board Independence case study 
illustrates the intricacies of political capture and the resultant necessity of strategic CSO 
partnerships and coalitions. The case rested on a very detailed understanding of what at first 
glance appeared to be quite disparate policies and legal frameworks for the operations and 
governance of State Owned Corporations. While the SOS’ legal subcommittee did a stellar job in 
unpacking the issues and highlighting the points of contention, the organisation was still reliant 
on the power of group pressure on the one hand and assistance from legal aides - often working 
pro bono - to take the minister to task. A similar trajectory of CSO’s media advocacy can be seen 
in Zimbabwe.
Media Alliance of Zimbabwe
Media activism has been gathering momentum in Zimbabwe, particularly in the wake of a 
protracted “Zimbabwe Crisis” from 2000-2019. The multifaceted crisis has economic, political 
and social consequences, including restrictions on media and freedoms. The crisis galvanized civil 
society into action, with many groups protesting against violation of media and human rights. “In 
response, the government adopted a ‘shock and awe’ communication policy designed to forestall 
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dissent, mediated or otherwise” (Chuma 2018: 2391). As in the 1980s and 1990s, the ZBC 
remained monopolised by the state in spite of charging licence fees and operating in a regulatory 
and policy framework which ostensibly legislates a PSB mandate. The ZBC functions more like a 
state broadcaster than a PSB, while the state controlled broadcasting context also succeeded in 
keeping out other players (Mano 2016). Newly introduced laws such as the Access to Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act (2002), the Public Order and Security Act (2002) and the 
Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) (2001) attempted to address the grievances from the public but, 
as will be discussed below, these measures did not go far enough in terms of democratising the 
public sphere. While the new act opened up the broadcasting space, it also at the same time 
solidified the government’s hold on the ZBC and placed control of the type of broadcasters and 
broadcasting that would be allowed firmly under the auspices of the information ministry. Similar 
to the South African case study discussed above, the BSA gives undue powers to the Minister of 
Information to control and impose impossible conditions on broadcasters. Some state officials in 
Zimbabwe are well aware of the impact of the failing policies in the PSB space. This comes 
through in a surprisingly frank personal interview with Hon Kindness Paradza, a member of 
parliament representing the ruling ZANU PF party who at the time of the interview was also a 
member of the Parliamentary Portfolio on Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, he noted 
that the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation [hereafter ZBC] faces many challenges, among 
these, it lacks 
input from the public or anybody apart from those who run ... the programmes at ZBC, 
they give us what they want us to see or hear…[in fact, the ZBC is not yet a] true public 
broadcaster”, it operates like a “state broadcaster, a mouthpiece only answerable to the 
Minister (Personal Interview with Hon. Kindness Paradza, 19 August 2014). 
Paradza added that rural Zimbabweans were among the most poorly served, both in terms of signal 
reach and representation within programmes. ZBC, in his view, does not serve the public, it serves 
vested interests and lacks accountability: 
...They follow ministers and ignore the input of the public...Here in Zimbabwe it is about 
the Minister of Information who has entire power over the entire process. It’s owned by 
parliament but captured by the Minister even though as a PSB it no longer receives funds 
from the state (ibid). 
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The ZBC’s dismal performance as a public service broadcaster has had a detrimental impact on its 
programming schedule and content. This has not gone unnoticed and hence backlash from the 
public continues unabated. Many Zimbabweans are especially protesting against its role as a public 
service given the poor quality of its service and some even took the broadcaster to court, preferring 
not to pay the obligatory licence fees. The dissatisfaction with ZBC has over the years given rise 
to media activism that seeks to protect and promote the communication rights and interests of 
disadvantaged publics.
Against the backdrop of sliding media freedoms and discontent with the lack of change in 
Zimbabwean broadcasting space as outlined above, the Media Alliance of Zimbabwe (MAZ) was 
formally established in 2012 as an activist civil society coalition advocating for media freedom 
and broadcasting in the public interest. Its strategy was to establish a wide front that agitates for 
change and includes bodies such as Media Monitoring Zimbabwe (MMPZ), the Zimbabwe 
Association of Community Radio Stations (ZACRAS) and MISA-Zimbabwe, part of 11-country 
chapters of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), a regional media reform non-
governmental organisation established in 1992. In addition, the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists 
(ZUJ); Zimbabwe National Editors’ Forum (ZINEF); Gender and Media Connect (GMC); the 
Media Centre; the Zimbabwe Association of Community Radio Stations (ZACRAS); the 
Voluntary Media Council of Zimbabwe (VMCZ); the African Community Publishing 
Development Trust (ACPDT) all form part of the alliance. These organisations are prominent for 
their media activism, with many especially advocating for opening up of the broadcasting space. 
In spite of many organisations advocating for broadcasting reform, these organisations were not 
necessarily aligned in terms of what media reform should look like. There were, for example, no 
shared understanding of what a reformed broadcasting space should look like to ensure a thriving 
PSB operating in the public interest (Chuma 2018). 
We argue that increased emphasis on advocacy requires pooling of competencies from CSO 
partnerships in a directed manner as working at cross-purposes could be detrimental to media 
reform. For example, in May 2009, after the establishment of the 2008 Government of National 
Unity (GNU), an All Stakeholder Conference for Media Reform was convened by the GNU’s 
Ministry of Information and Publicity. An academic account of the problems at the Stakeholder 
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Conference underscores what happens when CSOs lack coordination and pooling of resources: 
“As the proceedings of Day One drifted toward the end, it became clear that there was never going 
to be a common position on media reform among the ‘stakeholders’” (Chuma 2018: 2396). The 
agendas of CSOs were divided and vested interested sought to manipulate and widen divisions. 
The absence of a shared framework for media reform evident during this two-day conference, had 
a lasting impact on broadcasting reform in Zimbabwe. More than anything, it revealed bias and 
capture of the process by vested interests. For example, the 2009 conference resulted in the 
establishment of the not so independent broadcasting regulator, i.e. the Broadcasting Authority of 
Zimbabwe (BAZ), in terms of the Broadcasting Services Act (2001). While this change seems 
perfect in theory - even resulting in the granting of new radio and television licenses, many 
commentators note that the so-called independent regulator remains captured by vested political 
interests. The 2009 scenario illustrates clearly how the role of CSOs become limited if there is no 
shared values or principles guiding the process. The lack of shared understanding of definitions 
and principles to guide media reform can be considered disempowering. This lacuna in terms of 
CSO networking and alliance building was filled with the emergence of MAZ. 
MAZ Activism
MAZ’s activism for media reform in Zimbabwe was in response to changes in the political 
environment in Zimbabwe, with increased reform opportunities after the 2008 GNU and the new 
constitution of 2013. Motivated by political transitions, MAZ stepped into the space to foster 
media reform. Even though it informally existed from as far back as June 2007 as a loose and less 
focused media advocacy body, the formal establishment of MAZ as an “alliance or network of 
media associations” in Zimbabwe was in 2012. The idea behind formalising the Alliance was that 
it could potentially achieve a more focused strategy for the CSOs. They wanted increased 
momentum that comes with uniting their “impact in terms of joint local and international advocacy 
about the media crisis in the country and media policy reforms” (MAZ 2018). It describes its role 
as strategic coordination based on wide consultations on the Zimbabwe “media crisis” and working 
out relevant strategies of support that “could be used for maximum results” (MAZ 2018). In May 
2018 MAZ strategy emphasised “combining forces”, conducting regular reviews, using findings 
from conference reports, programme documents and resolutions, prioritizing strategic thinking and 
action: “Beneficiary organizations to this strategy were also extensively consulted through a series 
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of meetings as well as through receiving written and verbal comment on the draft of this 
document”. As an alliance of media support organisations, MAZ “serves as a key locus for strategy 
discussions among Zimbabwean organizations” (ibid.). Since 2012 MAZ’s approach to media 
reform has involved annual stakeholder meetings which bring together members of its coalition 
with representatives from government, political parties, journalists, and non-governmental 
organisations, among others.
From its inception MAZ has campaigned for broadcasting reform in Zimbabwe. To illustrate how 
MAZ engages in coalition building for broadcasting reform, we first use the example of MISA-
Zimbabwe, which has sought to promote and advocate for broadcasting which is free, independent, 
diverse and pluralistic. MISA-Zimbabwe and other CSOs within the MAZ initiative advocate for 
PSB reform by acting as watchdogs, lobbying for change of broadcasting laws, monitoring the 
media and producing independent research. Sometimes this is done directly through initiating legal 
action or campaigning in the public interest, sometimes it is done indirectly through commentary, 
press releases and analysis of the Zimbabwean broadcasting and media landscape.
MAZ alliance partner, MISA-Zimbabwe, for example, provided leadership in articulating the 
significance of a ruling in a court case dating back to 2012, the same year MAZ was formed. This 
case was brought by two applicants, Bernard Wekare (a private citizen) and Musangano Lodge (a 
business), who challenged the legitimacy of paying licence fees to ZBC. The gist of their argument 
rested on an interpretation that, in terms of the Zimbabwean Companies Act, the ZBC is constituted 
as a private company, rather than a public broadcaster. The applicants had argued that the ZBC as 
a private company had an unfair financial advantage over other competitors in the business of 
providing broadcasting services. In its 2016 ruling on the case, the constitutional court ruling 
upheld the PSB role of the ZBC, noting, among other views:
There is no doubt that the ZBC is a “public broadcaster” incorporated to carry out the 
functions of providing public broadcasting services. The primary purpose for the creation 
of a public broadcaster is to ensure that there is a balanced and consistent presentation to 
the public of a variety of ideas and information on diverse matters of public concern. The 
communication is made through programmes broadcast on television and radio in 
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accordance with the public’s collective right of access to such ideas and information 
(MISA-Zimbabwe, 2016: n.pag).
While the Concourt reaffirmed the public service role of the ZBC, its performance until then and 
since, has not been consistent with such an official PSB mandate. In this respect, MAZ alliance 
partner, MISA-Zimbabwe often provides valuable insights into the PSB mandate, through its 
analysis of court judgements related to PSB and media reform. MISA Zimbabwe is one of 11 
chapters of the Media Institute of Southern Africa, which promotes and defends media freedom 
and freedom of expression across the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region. 
In their analysis of the above Concourt ruling, they underlined the fact that “The matter at hand...is 
not whether ZBC covers or does not cover opposition party activities, but that when it does, its 
coverage is biased” (MISA, 2016). MISA- Zimbabwe also noted,
When juxtaposed against the constitutional court’s observation, the broadcaster would 
therefore require massive transformation that should be anchored on a revised broadcasting 
law in order to insulate it from continued political abuse and reposition it as a true public 
broadcaster (Ibid) .
In addition, they argued that the governance of ZBC “is politically compromised and lacks full 
public participation”. They also used the court judgment to campaign for the ZBC to comply with 
the findings of its “complaints unit in order to inspire public confidence in the use of the complaints 
mechanism to address the broadcaster’s shortcomings”. MISA-Zimbabwe’s analysis of the ruling 
combined with their formal campaign for the ZBC to consider their listeners and viewers, solidifies 
their role as a key voice in MAZ that leads in the sphere of PSB reform. From the above it can be 
seen how they strategically used the judgement to reinforce and review the purpose, mandate, 
independence, governance and public complaints mechanism that ZBC is supposed to adhere to as 
a PSB. 
In the wake of the Concourt ruling and in its role as a coalition, MAZ continues to call for the 
transformation of ZBC into a truly independent public broadcaster that adheres to the constitution. 
This role has included sustained efforts by MAZ members, partners and other individuals who take 
the ZBC to task with backing from MAZ. Their constant campaigns and collaborative action 
arguably forced the Zimbabwe government to relinquish state monopoly over public broadcasting 
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by introducing commercial and community radio stations such as StarFM and ZiFM after 2009. 
However, this turned out to be a half victory as the licensing process did not include television and 
also favoured radio ownership by those who are sympathetic to the ruling ZANU PF party. Before 
MAZ got involved, the broadcasting space was tightly regulated to include only sycophants of the 
ruling party. MAZ’s consistent campaigning for the opening up of the broadcasting space clearly 
yielded results, even if the reform did not go far enough. Part of the persisting problem is not only 
that the licencing context remains restrictive and captured but also how the control has resulted in 
biased news and current affairs programmes which especially undermine ZBC’s ability to perform 
an impartial role in election coverage. This state of affairs has been a contentious issue throughout 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence period and continues to propel civil society towards collaborative 
collective action strategy. A case in point would be the court challenge against ZBC’s coverage of 
the 2018 national elections.
In May 2018, the ZBC and the state-owned ZimPapers’s coverage of politics was challenged by 
groups who claimed in their filing affidavit’s that the broadcaster and newspapers were biased in 
favour of Zanu PF. In presenting their case to the High Court of Zimbabwe, the plaintives presented 
as evidence research on election coverage conducted by MAZ through its coalition partner MMPZ. 
In his 19 June 2019 ruling, the judge cited the veracity of the MMPZ research noting that:
Among other things, the analysis by Media Monitors is quite scientific. They compared 
like with like. It has balance. It is objective. The Electoral Act, in s l60K(3), permits anyone 
other than the ZMC to monitor news media and to report on their conduct during an election 
period. On the other hand, the ZBC's Annexure J is largely meaningless. It conceals more 
than it reveals. It does not compare anything with anything. All it does is to list the names 
of some opposition political parties and the dates on which something said by their 
spokespersons was aired. This does not prove anything, especially when compared to the 
applicants' data that analyses, under the different subjects, the coverage of all political 
parties and the editorial slant of the public media (Veritas v ZBC, ZEC, ZMC. 
BAZJudgment (2019). HMA/23/19/Case No. HC230/18, pp-16-17)
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In this case the judge upheld the MMPZ research provided by the plaintives as credible evidence 
of the public service broadcaster’s bias in electoral coverage. Broadcasting clearly remains 
captured by one political party. Sharing principles and common public service goals allowed the 
joint media advocacy to have an impact in court. Clearly MAZ has emerged as a formidable 
alliance for joint media advocacy and reform, using local and international civil society 
partnerships to uphold PSB values. The role of this alliance for media reform is described by 
Patience Zirima, MAZ’s previous chairperson:
Over the years, MAZ has collectively succeeded in advocating for the entrenchment of 
journalistic and media freedoms within the country’s Constitution, lobbied for the opening 
up of the broadcasting sector, resulting in the entry of new radio stations (Chigundu 
2019:n.pag). 
Arguably MAZ, has helped call for and shape an alternative media policy framework based on the 
Constitution and international best practices. The primary role of MAZ’s civic collaboration 
towards PSB reform is located in the broader campaigner to mobilise for Freedom of Expression, 
Right to Information, Media Freedom and Media Law and Policy Reform. 
Even though the partnership has internal challenges and faced arrests, MAZ has evolved a shared 
strategy based on research, consultation and a review of the work by alliance media advocacy 
organizations: “This was particularly done to understand the current and topical issues media 
actors are seized with and are prioritizing as requiring strategic thinking and action upon” 
(Chigundu 2019). Equally significant were the 2013 Media Stakeholders’ Conference whose 
theme was “Zimbabwe’s Media, the Next five years: Democratisation and Expansion” and the 
Media Stakeholders Conference of 2014 whose objective was to analyze the prevailing media and 
political context in Zimbabwe as well as to identify the major strategies required to adequately 
respond to the issues in the media sector. The steps taken by MAZ in building its alliance, among 
other things, demonstrates the significance of adapting to the realities in the context. This was 
evident at the 2019 MAZ media stakeholders conference when in response to MAZ’s request for 
more transparency in transforming the media sector, Nick Mangwana, the Permanent Secretary in 
Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services, noted that
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I think honestly, my ministry is making strenuous efforts to ensure reforms in the media 
are implemented but it’s a process and I think you (stakeholders) should be patient. We 
have been engaging with you time and again and this surely should be applauded, 
(Muranganwa 2019:n.pag).
The main contention was how PSB reforms, including the licensing of community radio stations, 
was without a clear policy framework given that the Broadcasting Service Act (2001) which is 
still in use is in serious need of overhaul. In addition, the conference attendees noted Mr 
Mangwana’s response was evasive as it avoided both specifics and timelines for carrying out 
reform. As will be seen below, some of these realities include an often hostile state, posing as 
one receptive towards change and reform.
Discussion
As can be seen above, both SOS: Support Public Broadcasting and Media Alliance of Zimbabwe 
have a track record of influencing PSB policy. Broadly conceived, this entails that both 
coalitions explicitly or implicitly influenced laws, policies or regulatory measures in South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. Yet, it could be argued that in spite of the nuanced and complex ways in 
which CSO coalitions like SOS and MAZ impact upon media policy in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, not enough is known about the roles played by such coalitions. CSOs operating in 
restrictive media environments are especially inclined to develop loose alliances in their attempts 
to exert maximum pressure on governments and policymakers. In the case of SOS for example, 
the reliance on the synergy associated with coalition formation is described by former National 
Coordinator, Kate Skinner:
...I mean, we wanted grassroots input and we felt the way to do it was to have mass-based 
organisations such as COSATU and the Treatment Action Campaign and those types of 
campaigning organisations… we thought that we can’t organise, uh, we can have 
individuals that are excited about our work that would be part of our working group but it 
would be better for us and more effective to get grassroots through organisation rather 
than to try to organise individuals all on our own. But we were very mindful of the fact 
that we had to have a grassroots face and our main aim was to have those grassroots 
organisations as part of us. And also the other thing which we did in terms of union 
representation was that we also got FEDUSA, a huge federation of producers as well, I 
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mean they kind of … dissipated and disappeared and was less active over time, but the 
fact is we wanted them as a huge federation of workers and to … their members through 
them (Personal interview with Kate Skinner, 2014).
Yet, the situation and space for CSOs in South Africa and Zimbabwe is fraught with suspicions 
and dangers for any CSO wishing to operate in the open. While the legal framework does not 
present significant obstacles for CSOs operating in South Africa, section 12(1)(a) of the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 does present a notable obstacle. This dated Act makes 
the failure to give notice or the giving of inadequate notice by any person who convened a 
gathering a criminal offence (ICNL 2019). The unscrupulous reliance on regulation 12(1)(a) of 
this Act presented considerable problems for CSOs operating in post-apartheid South Africa 
which became more pronounced as the internal battles within the ruling ANC gained momentum. 
Ben Turok (2018), director of the Institute for African Alternatives, notes that “[m]ost civil 
society organisations in South Africa experienced extreme frustration under the Zuma 
administration. The climate of intolerance and dishonesty in the state institutions discouraged 
formal public activity, leaving militant and disrupting protest as the only recourse at times.” 
(Turok 2018: n.pag) . On November 19, 2018, the South African Constitutional Court handed 
down a judgment in which it declared that section 12(1)(a) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
205 of 1993 was unconstitutional because it “...limits the right entrenched in section 17 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees that ‘[e]veryone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to 
assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions’” (ICNL 2019: n.pag). In Zimbabwe, 
regulations oblige NGOs to register with both the central government in the capital Harare and 
also with authorities at provincial level. In 2008, at the height of a severe economic and political 
crisis, NGOs, especially those working in humanitarian and human rights sectors, were banned. 
The ban was only reversed in 2009 during the coalition government. In both South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, CSOs funded by so-called Western organisations are branded agents of regime 
change, wanting to remove the freedoms achieved through the liberation struggle:
In Southern Africa, in Zimbabwe in particular, we don’t really care about civil society. 
Whatever they say we do not really care. We don’t even take into consideration what they 
say. In other words, if they say something which is good the government can choose to 
do the opposite. Civil society in this country, we do not really listen to it. The problem 
24
with civil society is that it is funded by donors. Whatever they are doing is regime 
change. Until and unless they want to address the government in a roundtable like this, 
possibly they can be heard (our emphasis of Personal Interview with Paradza, Harare 
2015) 
The above excerpt from a 2015 interview with the Honorable Kindness Paradza, exemplifies the 
government’s suspicions about CSOs both in terms of the impact they could have on the media-
policy landscape in Zimbabwe as well as in relation to who is ultimately driving the change. 
Faced with problems of dealing with the state mistrust and power, SOS and MAZ’s strategy 
centers on coalition-building with a wide front of stakeholders. Both organizations are known to 
stage roundtable events whereby leading media advocacy bodies are invited to participate and 
provide input for policy directions. In the case of SOS, SABC staff are often also invited as 
presenters or attendees. We argue that such stakeholder dialogue has enabled SOS and MAZ to 
widen their reach in and outside Southern Africa. The article contends that if this strategy of 
enhanced networking, solidarity and mechanism can be extended transnationally, an additional 
layer of participatory reflection on broadcasting reform can be added that could also offset the 
loss of capacity from any one CSO to speak truth to power. Reflections on regional issues and 
dialogues on media networks will result in a people-centered agenda. By creating a 
transdisciplinary collaboration of CSOs focused on media reform, SOS and MAZ can be seen as 
building cognitive surplus, by means of synthesis of existing CSO’s time, knowledge, energy and 
expertise. These initiatives can be the basis for more directed pathways to impact. Joint media 
advocacy and media freedom policies on both national and regional levels can potentially be 
more impactful (Mkundu 2019). SOS and MAZ have already shown how CSOs working 
together enhance transformation of the PSB and entire media sectors on many levels. We argue 
that strategic transnational cooperation between a selection of transdisciplinary organisations 
could similarly benefit PSB reform for the region as a whole.
From the SOS and MAZ case studies presented above, it can be ascertained that coalition 
building is reliant on the one hand on strategic partnerships around issues of common interests 
after the fact (i.e., at policy implementation phase), but on the other hand, it could benefit from 
more participatory approaches towards partnerships in the development phase (i.e. influencing 
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the shaping of media policy in the public interest). This means that media advocacy groups need 
to align somewhat differently in relation to those whom they seek to hold to account: a less 
adversarial approach might benefit the media environment if an ecological approach to 
participatory policy-making is followed. In a forthcoming article we unpack in greater detail 
what such a model could entail within the Southern African context.
Conclusion
From our foregoing analysis, it can be ascertained that a broad alliance of civil society groups 
with a pool of skills and resources, employing some of the techniques highlighted above, have to 
some extent succeeded in holding public broadcasters in South Africa and Zimbabwe to account. 
The pathway to impact in PSB reform involves leveraging civic alliances and transdisciplinary 
networks locally, nationally and regionally, as explicated above. Here, we contend that 
reimagining the relationship between PSBs, civic groups and citizens (sometimes referred to as 
social contract) could bring new levels of participation and accountability mechanisms, which 
could in turn render public services more effective and broadly foster more democratic PSBs. 
From our case studies, it should be clear that impactful engagement is ideally developed through 
participatory mechanisms that are open, inclusive and empowering. Impact in broadcasting 
reform arises not only from CSOs’ ability to be relevant, but also importantly on their ability to 
create collaborative pro-reform minded and multi-skilled civic coalitions that can push for 
reform. The pivotal element is for empowerment of CSOs so that decision making and control of 
PSB resources is made in the public interest. 
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